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Criminal procedure scholars devote themselves to debating the
proper scope of the Constitution's limits on police methods. The ap-
plication of constitutional rules, however, depends entirely on how
facts are found on motions to suppress or at trials of civil rights ac-
tions. Police perjury, if accepted, can defeat any constitutional rule.
Thus, the debates about stop-and-frisk, automobile searches, and po-
lice interrogation have a scholastic quality; no matter what rule appel-
late courts adopt, police may circumvent that rule by persuading trial
courts to accept an incorrect account of the facts.
If police perjury were rare, academic discussion of it would lose
little relevance. Unfortunately, criminal procedure scholars agree
that police perjury is not exotic. Police perjury has been called "perva-
sive,"' "an integral feature of urban police work,"2 and the "demon in
the criminal process."3 This essay suggests a new strategy for dealing
with this problem.
My thesis holds that courts deciding suppression motions should
admit expert testimony based on polygraph examinations, and draw
an adverse inference from the failure to introduce such evidence,
whenever the outcome of the dispute depends on the credibility of
conflicting testimony given by the defendant and the police. To avoid
confusion, I would like to set out at the beginning the precise ap-
proach I defend.
At the dose of the testimony at a hearing on a suppression mo-
tion, upon motion by either party or sua sponte, the court should de-
termine whether the outcome depends on resolving a conflict in the
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., Northwestern, 1980; J.D. Michigan,
1983.
1 Robert P. Bums, Bright Lines and Hard Edges: Anatomy of a Criminal Evidence Decision,
85J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 843, 877 n.99 (1995).
2 Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1, 70 (1994).
3 H. RIcHARD UVLLER, TFmPERED Z.AL 111 (1988).
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testimony on the basis of credibility. If the court finds that the issue
turns on credibility, the court should inquire whether either party is
willing to supplement the record with a polygraph examination of the
party's witness or witnesses. Each party could elect to supplement the
record in this way, but the decision to do so would have to be made at
that time. Neither side could wait for the outcome of the other's ex-
amination; and the results of any examination would be admissible
regardless of the result.
Examinations would need to be administered by a qualified ex-
aminer, after notice to the opposing party that enabled the opposing
party's representatives to attend the examination. The judge would
not be bound by the results of the polygraph examinations, but could
consider them along with all the evidence in the case. The results,
however, would become part of the record, and in an appropriate case
might be considered, along with all the circumstances of the case, by
an appellate court in deciding whether the factual findings below
were clearly erroneous.
My argument proceeds through four stages. First, I illustrate the
corrosive effects of swearing contests involving the police by discussing
the case of Forida v. Bostick.4 Second, I demonstrate that the available
evidence strongly indicates that police perjury is a widespread phe-
nomenon. Third, I show that polygraph examinations can make a
powerful contribution towards determining the truth, and that the
usual reasons for excluding polygraph evidence from judicial pro-
ceedings do not apply in the context of swearing contests in which
one of the witnesses is a police officer. As the Fifth Circuit recently
recognized in United States v. Posado,5 the Supreme Court's Daubert de-
cision,6 which liberalized the standard for admissibility of expert testi-
mony, creates an opportunity for introducing polygraph evidence in
the suppression context. Finally, I submit that even if polygraph evi-
dence were of doubtful reliability, its admissibility to resolve swearing
contests would give police departments a powerful incentive to mini-
mize the number of swearing contests by making available reliable
proof of what happened during an encounter between the police and
a citizen.
II. THE PERVERSE DYNAMICS OF SWEARING CONTESTS INVOLVING
THE POLICE
Those who follow criminal procedure developments in the
4 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
5 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995).
6 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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Supreme Court will remember Florida v. Bostick, where the Court up-
held the constitutionality of so-called "bus sweeps." I focus on this
decision because it provides a textbook example of how swearing con-
tests at a suppression hearing can undermine the enforcement and
distort the development of substantive rules. Indeed, the very fact
that good lawyers only think of Bostick as a case about substantive
Fourth Amendment law suggests that we now regard police control of
the facts as the normal state of affairs. My concern here, however, is
not with the merits of the Bostick decision, but with the Hobson's
choice the judiciary faces when the police give an improbable account
of the facts that led to an arrest.
Terrance Bostick was an Atlanta-bound passenger on a Grey-
hound bus that made a stop in Fort Lauderdale. 7 Two Broward
County Sheriff's Department officers, Detective Nutt and Detective
Rubino, boarded the bus.8 The driver, who knew that the police had
a drug-interdiction policy of boarding randomly selected busses, got
off and closed the door.9
The officers found cocaine in a bag that belonged to Bostick.10
He moved to suppress the cocaine on Fourth Amendment grounds.
At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that they advised Bos-
tick that they were police officers prior to the search, and that Bostick
consented to the search that discovered the drugs." However, Bos-
tick testified that he never gave consent, although he also testified that
he did not affirmatively protest or object to the search. 12
There were two other witnesses to the search, both young men.' 3
Both witnesses were summoned but neither appeared to testify at the
suppression hearing.14 Thus the case presented a common situation,
in which the facts governing a claim of constitutional right depend on
whether one believes the account of the police or the account of a
criminal defendant.
On its face, the police account is highly improbable. Why would
a cocaine smuggler consent to a search that could send him to prison
for decades? We can suppose that criminals are not rocket scientists
and that Freud's insights apply to criminals no less than to anyone
else. But even if a self-destructive error of the sort posited by the po-
7 Joint Appendix at 34-35, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (No. 89-1717).
8 Id. at 9.
9 Id. at 12.
10 Id. at 53-54.
11 Id. at 8-10, 20.
12 Id. at 37.
13 Id. at 5-6.
14 Id. One was deposed; but the deposition is not included in the appendix the parties
filed with the Supreme Court.
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lice is possible, it is not probable.
Consider the words of Judge Seay, who ruled on the suppression
motion:
Yes. Well, whatever the issue, he [Judge Moe, who had ruled the bus-
sweep tactic unconstitutional in a similar case] didn't like the whole pic-
ture, which I'm not crazy about, either, but when you've got sworn testi-
mony from two police officers and they're testifying, sometimes you
don't have much other than that and you have to go along with the
sworn testimony but it does really stretch the imagination when they're
standing there in an aisle and talking to someone and just checking all
the bags. It's very intimidating even if there is consent.15
Judge Seay's remarks nicely capture the unpleasant situation fac-
ing trial judges faced with swearing contests at suppression hearings.
The police story may be improbable, but police officers must be pre-
sumed honest, and the defendant's word is worthless.
In a swearing contest, the trial judge can discredit the police testi-
mony only by branding the police as liars and accepting the word of
an apparent felon. Typically the police, rather than the felon, will be
telling the truth, but in a significant number of cases the police ac-
count is false.16 Nonetheless judges decide cases one at a time, so the
police almost always win the swearing contest.
The police are aware of this bias. The resulting incentives are
exquisitely perverse. First, police officers indifferent to constitutional
rights can violate them with impunity. I cannot prove that the Brow-
ard County officers deliberately planned to roust every black kid on
those busses and then lie about consent whenever they found drugs.
No one, however, can prove the opposite.
While the scope of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, and the
purposes of the exclusionary rule, are much debated, the prevailing
view is that the exclusionary rule is designed to deter unconstitutional
behavior,1 7 especially, if not exclusively, when the police act in bad
faith.18 But how can police acting in bad faith be deterred, if they
know that their word will be accepted by the courts? Because almost
any meritorious suppression motion can be defeated by incorrect fac-
tual findings, police knowledge that courts will usually believe police
perjury takes a serious bite out of the rule's deterrent effect.
Second, and even more troubling, is that the acceptance of police
perjury is known not just by individual officers, but by police depart-
15 Id. at 49.
16 See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (purpose of excluding
tainted evidence is to deter future unlawful police conduct).
18 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911-13 (1984) (costs of excluding evidence
outweigh deterrent benefits when police reasonably rely on defective search warrant).
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ment policy-makers. They know that police testimony will typically be
believed. Why, then, should they take measures that would enable
courts to determine the facts independently of police testimony? Why
should they require citizen observers or video cameras in patrol cars?
Why should they-almost thirty years after Miranda v. Arizonag-finally
decide to record interrogations? The police cannot win any cases with
these procedures, they can only lose cases with them.
The mischief continues on appeal. An appellate court cannot
second-guess trial court credibility rulings. So the appellate courts
must make rules based on the false assumption that the facts will be
accurately determined below (the usual approach these days, as evi-
denced by Bostick) or by extending constitutional rights so that the
police will have difficulty denying the facts that set up the rights. The
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and the Miranda decision,
are examples of this latter approach.
Neither approach is very attractive. Ignoring police perjury with
the bland assurance that trial courts can ferret it out is to mock the
Constitution with hypocrisy. Trying to define rights that can be suc-
cessfully asserted no matter what testimony is believed is both irra-
tional and futile. It is irrational, because more and more cases of
legitimate police work must be thrown out in order to nullify a few
cases of illegitimate police work. It is futile because police perjury can
migrate from one fact to another. Told they must record the facts in
advance by obtaining a search warrant, unscrupulous police officers
will simply lie in the warrant affidavit. Told that the test of a confes-
sion's admissibility is not voluntariness but a waiver made after warn-
ings, unscrupulous police officers will simply lie about giving the
warnings and getting the waiver.
I have focused here on the consequences of our systemic invita-
tion to police perjury, reserving for last the rather simple and obvious
point that police perjury is wrong. Barring some powerful counter-
vailing moral obligation, it is wrong to break oaths; it is wrong to
break the criminal law; and it is especially indefensible for public offi-
cials to do so in the name of law and order.
I have nothing against officers Nutt and Rubino. I expect that
they are, on the whole, more honest than Terrance Bostick. I do not
know that they lied that day in Judge Seay's courtroom. As things
stand, however, no one who was not on the bus that day really knows
whether they were lying or not. When it comes to police testimony,
Judge Seay is an agnostic as an individual, but a true believer as a
judge. One could say the same about most criminal court judges in




We are, as in many other contexts, asking too much of our police.
How would you behave if you knew that you could count on having
your story accepted in court? If called to testify in a case of interest to
you, how would you testify, knowing that your testimony will be be-
lieved? Would you testify according to the truth, or according to
justice? Wouldn't it be strange if we didn't have a police perjury
problem?
The question is not whether we have a problem. The real ques-
tion is the severity of the problem. I turn now to discuss some recent
evidence suggesting that police perjury is a problem too large to
ignore.
III. POLICE PERJURY IS COMMON
Experienced trial lawyers for many years have expressed the view
that police officers frequently lie on the stand.20 Some early empirical
research following Mapp v. Ohio21 showed that the police testified to
the abandonment of narcotics (so-called "dropsy testimony") more
than twice as often after the application of the exclusionary rule as
before, indicating a widespread willingness among police to lie on the
stand.22 Nonetheless, because it is difficult to determine whether the
police are lying in any given case, the dimensions of the problem have
been speculative. Recent contributions to the legal literature, how-
ever, make it increasingly clear that the problem is serious indeed.
One such contribution is Richard Uviller's account of a sabbatical
leave spent with police officers in New York city.2 3 Another is Myron
Orfield's interview study of prosecutors, defense lawyers, and trial
judges involved in suppression motions in Chicago.2 4 Yet a third is
the NAACP's investigation of police practices in six cities, undertaken
in the wake of the videotaped beating of Rodney King.2 5
Uviller was a New York City prosecutor for fourteen years. He
20 In a typically measured comment, Alan Dershowtiz declared that "[a] Imost all police
lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants."
ALAN DERSHOWrIZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi (1982). Fifteen years earlier, IrvingYounger had
called attention to the problem in a biting article in The Nation. See Irving Younger, The
Pejury Routine, 204 NATION 596 (1967).
21 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22 Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police
Practices 1960-62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 555-60, 570 (1968). See also PAUL CHEviGNY, POLICE
POWER 187 (1969) (discussing research by Sarah Barlow).
23 UVILLER, supra note 3.
24 Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Penury, and the Heater Factor. An Exclusionay Rule in
the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 75 (1992).
25 CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ET AL., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY (1995).
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spent eight months observing the operations of a New York City police
precinct. Uviller thought that the police were in general both natural
and forthcoming in his presence, but "[o]ne subject on which I could
not induce the cops [I was studying] to share any firsthand experience
was perjury."26 Nonetheless, he came away convinced that police per-
jury is not exotic.
His impression is worth quoting at some length. After describing
a case in which the police, lacking a warrant, induced the suspect to
leave his mother's apartment by simply ringing the bell and standing
wordlessly at the doorway, he writes:
I have no data to illustrate it, but my suspicion is that out of just
such circumstances is born the most common form of police perjury:
the instrumental adjustment. A slight alteration in the facts to accommo-
date an unwieldy constitutional constraint and obtain ajust result. How
easy it would be to go into the flat, grab the suspect, and later say you
busted him as he was leaving his mother's apartment to get a six-pack at
the corner bodega. Same difference. Who will believe this stickup guy if
he takes the stand and testifies, in his own interest, to the contrary? And
ironically, the perjured version is, on its face, probably more credible
than the actual events ....
By the same logic, cops may insert a little invention to fortify the
probable cause upon which a fruitful search was based. Add a small but
deft stroke to the facts-say, a visible bulge at the waistband of a person
carrying a pistol. Just enough to put some flesh on the hunch that actu-
ally induced the officer to give the man a toss; it might make all the
difference. Or a police officer, understandably eager to have the jury
hear the bad guy's full and free confession, might advance slightly the
moment at which the Miranda warnings were recited to satisfy the courts'
insistence that they precede the very first question in a course of interro-
gation. That sort of thing. Although no one admitted it to me in so
many words, I think most police officers regard such alterations of events
as the natural and inevitable outgrowth of artificial and unrealistic post
facto judgments that release criminals. The prevalence of this sort of
perjury leads some cynics to suggest that the principal effect of the
Supreme Court's carefully crafted interpretations of the Constitution on
the behavior of those to whom their words are directed is to teach the
police what they should say on the witness stand rather than what they
should do in the streets.
2 7
Uviller, then, concluded that "most police officers" view police perjury
as "natural and inevitable," and he speaks casually of the "prevalence"
of the phenomenon.28
Orfield interviewed judges, public defenders, and prosecutors as-
26 UvILLuR, supra note 3, at 111.
27 Id. at 115-16 (emphasis in original).
28 A recent official inquiry into police corruption in New York reached similar conclu-
sions about the extent of police perjury. SeeJoe Sexton, New York Police Often Lie Under Oath
Report Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al.
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signed to fourteen criminal courtrooms in Chicago.2 9 His conclusions
also deserve quotation:
Significantly, the respondents outlined a pattern of pervasive police
perjury intended to avoid the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Dishonesty occurs in both the investigative process and the courtroom.
The respondents report systematic fabrication in case reports and affida-
vits for search warrants, creating artificial probable cause which forms
the basis of later testimony. Moreover, police keep dual sets of investiga-
tory files; official files and "street files." Exculpatory material in the
street files may be edited from the official record. Respondents, includ-
ing prosecutors, estimate that police commit perjury between 20% and
50% of the time they testify on Fourth Amendment issues. This perjury
may be tolerated, or even encouraged, by prosecutors at each step in the
process in both direct and indirect ways.30
Orfield later notes:
On average, the judges in the Courts Study estimate that judges disbe-
lieve police testimony 18% of the time, compared with the public de-
fenders estimate of 21% of the time, and the state's attorneys estimate of
19%. While these figures alone suggest a shocking level of police per-
jury, the majority ofjudges and public defenders, and almost half of the
state's attorneys, believe that police lie more often than they are
disbelieved.3
1
The fact that judges and even prosecutors believed perjury to be so
common is a real eye-opener.
Orfield found, however, that judges only rarely rejected police
testimony. "In a 'swearing contest' between an officer and a defend-
ant, many respondents believe the defendant always loses. Some ar-
gued that before a judge disbelieves an officer, the defendant must
'prove beyond a reasonable doubt' that the officer is lying."32 Orfield
quotes one judge caught in the swearing-contest trap:
Many times, I feel the police are lying, but I can't make a finding on a
hunch. I've got to have some facts. If the defense can't show anything,
that the police officer is telling a lie, then I have to find for the police-
man .... You walk into a case and as a rule you believe the police
officer-you've got to believe police more than defendant.33
Thus the judge might well believe that the police lie in a fifth of the
cases, and yet never make a finding of police perjury in any single
case.
The NAACP report is less a study of police perjury than a study of
police brutality and abuse. Nonetheless brutality and abuse cannot
29 Orfield, supra note 24, at 81-82.
30 Orfield, supra note 24, at 82-83.
31 Id. at 107 (footnotes omitted).
32 Id. at 118.
33 Id. at 119 (ellipses in original).
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occur absent police control over the determination of facts in subse-
quent litigation. After holding hearings in six cities, the NAACP inves-
tigators concluded that what was unusual about the Rodney King case
was the videotape, not the police behavior.3 4
This sort of behavior can survive only if it can be effectively cov-
ered-up. The report found that the police frequently file fabricated
charges of assault or resisting arrest against victims of excessive
force.35 The investigators describe a "code of silence" that calls upon
police officers to cover-up the misconduct of other police.3 6
One might, of course, disbelieve the witnesses who gave evidence
to the NAACP team. But it is hard to see why they would make up
their accounts. In the context of the study, they were not attempting
to defeat criminal charges against themselves. Rather, they were com-
ing forward (and risking police retaliation) to give what can only be
supposed to be sincere accounts of police misconduct. Unless the po-
lice stand ready to perjure themselves, and unless police perjury is
generally accepted by the courts, the state of affairs described by the
report could not exist.
Last summer empirical evidence of police perjury moved from
the law library to the living room. During the O.J. Simpson trial,
Detective Mark Fuhrman, who declared on the stand that he had not
used the word "nigger" in the last decade, was shown to have perjured
himself when tapes of him uttering that word surfaced.3 7 Meanwhile,
the FBI-always thought of as America's model of professional, by-the-
book law enforcement-was under investigation for destroying docu-
ments related to the Ruby Ridge shoot-out.38
What is to be done? In some ways, the problem is not only too
large to ignore, it is too large to address. It would require judges,
lawyers, and academics to admit that much of what they attempt to
achieve by way of regulating the police is futile and naive. There is,
moreover, a genuine impulse to sympathize with perjury that pro-
motes justice in individual cases. Perjury can function as a shock-ab-
sorber, making sure that the exclusionary rule does not cost the
34 See OGLETREE ET AL., supra note 25, at 29-39.
35 Id. at 42-44.
36 Id. at 74-76.
37 See William Claiborne, Launyers in Simpson Case Reach Compromise Allowing Judge Ito to
Stay On, WASH. PoST, Aug. 17, 1995, at A10 ("[Defense] attorneys will submit written argu-
ments on the admissibility of tapes containing 30 instances of Fuhrman's allegedly using
the racial epithet 'nigger', and 17 instances in which he admits planting or manufacturing
evidence and lying or covering up police misconduct.").
38 See Pierre Thomas, ForProsecutors in Idaho Case, FBI was also an Adversay, WASH. POST,
Aug. 17, 1995, at Al, A15 (investigative task force "cited missing faxes, notes from head-
quarters and drafts of the operations plan for the siege").
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convictions of especially heinous criminals. The temptation to acqui-
esce in hypocritical complacency is strong.
We must reject this temptation. If our settled judgments about
constitutional rights cannot survive honest fact-finding, then let us
change our judgments about constitutional rights. If we are serious in
our claim that constitutional rights have priority over enforcing the
criminal law, then let us find ways of enforcing constitutional rights.
Some commentators have shown the willingness to openly ad-
dress the problem. Both Morgan Cloud39 and William Stuntz4° have
recognized the relationship between the Fourth Amendment's war-
rant requirement and the police perjury problem. Professor Cloud
argues that police perjury calls for both a more rigorous warrant re-
quirement and for greater judicial reliance on the objective facts
known to the officer.4 ' On the other hand, Professor Stuntz argues
that the court uses warrants to prevent after-the-fact bias from influ-
encing judicial decisions, but not to prevent police perjury.42 He sug-
gests that any warrant requirement that would place meaningful
obstacles in the way of police perjury would greatly limit searches
based on informants, interfering with enforcement of organized crim-
inal activity, especially drug distribution.43
Professor Stuntz's approach is the better of the two. Police will-
ing to lie can lie not only about exigent circumstances but also about
consent and abandonment. "Objective facts" depend on what testi-
mony is believed at the suppression hearing. When the privacy inter-
est to be invaded is less than that of arrest or home invasion, the
burden of the requirement seems out of proportion to its contribu-
tion to protecting liberty4-unless warrants become so easy to obtain
that they cease to protect liberty.
45
So, in the end I am skeptical about letting the procedural tail wag
the substantive dog. At the least we should artificially interpret the
constitution to protect its true meanings from police perjury only as a
last resort, with reluctance and regret. If there is a procedural ap-
39 Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311 (1994).
40 William Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881, 914-18
(1991).
41 Cloud, supra note 39, at 1346-48.
42 Stuntz, supra note 40, at 919.
43 Id. at 935-41.
44 Id. at 889-97. See also Craig Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the Fourth
Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 441-42 (1993).
45 See WAwm R LAFAvE, 2 SEARCH & SEizuRE sec. 4.1(a) at 120 (2d ed. 1987) ("it may
well be that, as a practical matter, the warrant process can serve as a meaningful device for
the protection of Fourth Amendment rights only if used selectively to prevent those police
practices which would be most destructive of Fourth Amendment values").
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proach that would greatly reduce the credibility, and thereby the
temptation, of police perjury, that approach deserves a trial before we
resign ourselves to doing our best to protect constitutional rights from
police who can get away with lying. The obvious alternative is the
polygraph.
IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY BASED ON POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS
SHOULD BE ADMISSIBLE AT SUPPRESSION HEARINGS WHEN
THE OUTCOME DEPENDS ON CREDIBILITY
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceutica&46 makes clear that Federal Rules of Evidence permit
expert testimony whenever the expert testimony is based on valid sci-
ence, is relevant to the specific issues in dispute, and would be helpful
to the jury. The Court explained:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge
must determinate at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the
expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This
entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodol-
ogy underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.4
7
The Court took pains to add, however, that even when the proponent
establishes the scientific validity of the testimony and the fit between
the evidence and the issue, the judge must still determine whether the
evidence would be helpful to the jury. Rule 403 always allows the
judge to exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by its potential for prejudice.4
8
The three-stage inquiry mandated by Daubert-evaluating validity
according to an open-ended list of factors, checking the fit of the evi-
dence with the dispute on trial, and finally weighing the probative
value of the evidence against its potential to mislead, confuse, or carry
away the trier of fact-is, to say the least, not self-executing. 49 I sug-
gest that, under Daubert, polygraph evidence deserves to be received at
suppression hearings, although I shall rely more on the unique proce-
dural problem of the swearing contest between police and defendants
than upon any change in the evidentiary standard Daubert followed.
Thus, even in jurisdictions that do not follow the Federal Rules, there
is a strong case for admissibility.
46 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
47 Id. at 2796 (foomotes omitted).
48 See 113 S. Ct. at 2797-98.




The first step in the Daubert inquiry is to determine whether the
proffered expert testimony is based on valid science. The Supreme
Court declared that the validity inquiry depended on an open-ended
set of considerations. The Court specifically directed attention to
whether the technique had been tested; whether it has been subjected
to the peer review process in scientific publications; what the error
rates for the technique are or might be; and whether the technique is
generally accepted among experts.
50
The polygraph has of course been tested a great deal. Several
studies have been published in peer reviewed journals. These studies
suggest an acceptable range of rates of error. The polygraph, more-
over, is generally accepted by experts in the field of security and
investigation.
For judicial purposes, the critical question is whether polygraph
examination successfully detects deception and its absence. In the
polygraph literature this is called the question of "validity." Validity is
hard to study because the real truth is not always known, and when it
is known that knowledge can influence the polygraph determination.
The term "reliability" refers to the consistency with which different
evaluators come to the same conclusions regarding the honesty of the
same subject.
Nonetheless, there are by now many studies of polygraph validity
in the context of criminal investigation, in which ground truth is de-
termined by some generally accepted measure such as post-polygraph
confession or discovery of physical evidence. There have been at least
three major literature reviews of polygraph studies; each has surveyed
these field studies. The first, conducted by the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA), concluded that "while polygraph examinations us-
ing [the Control Question Test method] in criminal investigations de-
tect deceptiveness and nondeceptiveness better than chance, there is
also what in some cases might be considered a high error rate, particu-
larly for nondeceptive subjects."51
The second review was conducted by the Department of Defense
(DOD). The DOD study noted that the high error rates that con-
50 See 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
51 OTA, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING 52 (1983) [hereinafter OTA
Report].
Under the CQ format, a subject is asked an anxiety-provoking question unconnected
with the incident under investigation as a control question. The question will produce
a lying response, either because it is designed to produce a false answer or because the
subject is directed to lie in answering. The control question is then followed by ques-
tions regarding the incident being investigated.
James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and
Daubert, 1996 ILL. L. REV. 363, 378 (foomote omitted).
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cerned the OTA were found in the "blind" evaluations-opinions
based on the paper records, not the opinions of evaluators who them-
selves administered the polygraph examination.52 There is a good
reason why blind evaluations are less valid than examiner evaluations,
especially with respect to innocent subjects. All the machine records
is stress; if an innocent individual is stressed during questioning by
something other than the burden of deception-a noise in the street,
concern for a sick relative, or what not-the machine will nonetheless
record the stress. The examiner who witnesses the interview is in a
better position to rule out-or in-alternative explanations for the
tension detected by the machine.
The DOD report gives the following evaluation of the field test
literature:
Field studies of criterion validity are fairly consistent in their results
for guilty subjects. When original examiner subjective decision is used
to predict the criteria, 90% to 100% of the guilty subject have been cor-
rectly classified. Results are similar for studies using a criterion that is
independent of examiner decision and studies using a criterion corre-
lated with examiner decision. Numerical field scoring by the original
examiner, chart scrutiny by a blind examiner, and numerical analysis by
a blind examiner does not appear to alter the percentage of guilty sub-
jects correctly classified when inconclusives are omitted.
The results for innocent subjects are much more variable. When
original examiner's clinical judgment is used to predict the criterion,
omitting inconclusives, from 14% to 100% of the innocent subjects are
correctly classified. The Barland and Raskin (1976) study was the only
one to show poor results; and problems with this study have been dis-
cussed. [The study determined ground truth by giving panels case files,
sometimes with meager information; thus disagreement between the
polygraph test and the panel conclusion does not establish that the poly-
graph result was erroneous]. Omitting the Barland and Raskin data,
85% to 100% of the innocent subjects were correctly classified. It is im-
portant to note that the study reporting a 85% correct classification fig-
ure used a criterion that was both independent of original examiner
decision and accurate (Ginton et al., 1982).53
More recently, Norman Ansley, who edits Polygraph, the official
journal of the American Polygraph Association, reviewed all studies of
real cases since 1980.54 In the studies in which the control question
test approach was used, "examiners were correct in 301 of 316 NDI
(No Deception Indicated) calls, for 95%. They were correct in 629 of
52 Department of Defense, The Accuracy and Utility of Polygraph Testing 59 (1984)
[hereinafter DOD Report].
53 Id. at 37-38.




634 DI (Deception Indicated) calls, for 99%."55
Each of these reviews had a mission. The OTA report was pre-
pared at the request of a Congress preparing to strictly regulate poly-
graph screening in employment. In that context a ten percent rate of
false positives is extremely troubling; it could mean unfairly excluding
thousands of people from jobs. The DOD, however, has long relied
on the polygraph both in investigations and in security screening.
Ansley is a professional polygrapher and a dedicated proponent of the
technique.
Nonetheless the underlying studies seem to point in the same di-
rection. In criminal investigations, a competent polygraph examina-
tion has a very high probability of detecting deception, and a high
probability of detecting the absence of deception. Thus, the testing,
peer review, and error rate aspects relevant to the first stage of the
Daubert analysis support admissibility.
Outside the courtroom, many sober individuals, caring only
about the reliability of results, rely on the polygraph. The CIA, the
Defense Department, and big business rely on the polygraph.56 Most
police departments rely on it, either to screen employment appli-
cants57 or to interview witnesses.58
The polygraph technique, then, has (1) been tested empirically,
with generally strong results; (2) the supporting studies typically have
survived the peer review process; (3) error rates are low, although in-
correct findings of deception are more common than incorrect find-
ings of no deception; (4) the technique is relied on by responsible
people in many out-of-court contexts. 59 These conclusions are not
55 Id. at 172.
56 See DOD Report, supra note 52, at 11 (CIA has used polygraph since 1950; DOD has
used polygraph since 1951); Joseph P. Buckley, The Use of Polygraph in the Workplace: The
American Polygraph Association's View, 17 POLYGRAPH 80 (1988) ("While exact figures are dif-
ficult to determine, several surveys indicate that approximately 20% of all major businesses
in the United States use polygraph. In particular industries the figures are much higher.
for example, approximately 50% of all commercial banks and over 60% of all retail opera-
tions use polygraph in some capacity.").
57 Robert T. Meesig & Frank Horvath, Changes in Usage, Practices and Policies in Pre-Em-
ployment Polygraph Testing in Law Enforcement Agencies in the United States: 1964-1991, 22 POLY-
GRAPH 1 (1993) (62% of the largest law enforcement agencies use the technique of pre-
employment polygraph screening).
58 See, e.g., UVILLER, supra note 3, at 173 ("The fact is that, notwithstanding its unsuita-
bility for jurors, the polygraph is widely employed by both government and the private
sector for questions of employee honesty and the like. And law enforcement agencies,
including prosecutors' offices, occasionally use the polygraph to check the veracity of a
questionable witness.").
59 This point should carry the day in jurisdictions that continue to adhere to the rule of
Frye v. United States, 293 P.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (scientific evidence admissible when
generally accepted among experts; primitive lie detector test inadmissible). The idea be-
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terribly controversial, and collectively they make a persuasive case that
polygraph evidence passes the validity threshold of the Daubert test.60
Why, then, have courts traditionally shown such hostility to the
polygraph? There is no real paradox here. A cluster of powerful rea-
sons, having little to do with scientific validity and much to do with the
litigation process, counsels excluding polygraph evidence in ordinary
litigation. Two initial observations deserve emphasis. First, in our sys-
tem, polygraph evidence would be evaluated by a lay jury. Second,
credibility is an issue in almost every case, civil or criminal.
Courts have expressly relied on the jury factor in ruling poly-
graph evidence generally inadmissible. 61 Even if the technique is reli-
hind the Frye test is that courts can use consensus of expert opinion as a proxy for scientific
reliability. If most experts in the security and law-enforcement field rely on the polygraph,
including the federal government's intelligence services and the police themselves, Frye
counsels deferring to their expert judgment.
In truth, the real fight about polygraph evidence in court has less to due with reliabil-
ity than with concern about prejudice, a concern that applies regardless of whether the
general test of admissibility is that of Frye or of Daubert. Hence, the arguments I develop
about the unique context of the suppression hearing suggest a rule of admissibility in that
context under Frye as well as Daubert.
60 See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995) (detailed review of
polygraph evidence under Daubert factors, supporting admissibility); United States v. Gal-
breth, 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995) (same). In United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120
(E.D.N.Y. 1993), the court adhered to pre-Daubert Second Circuit precedent holding poly-
graph evidence inadmissible. The Black court justified the exclusion of the evidence solely
on the ground of unreliability. See id. at 122. See also United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206
(2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Bormovsky, 879 F.2d 30 (1989); United States v. Lech, 895
F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding polygraph evidence inadmissible for fear ofjuror
prejudice; intimating without holding that per se rule of inadmissibility survived Daubert).
If correct, this analysis would preclude admitting polygraph evidence at suppression
hearings. But the Black court's conclusion, with respect, seems to ignore the weight of
modem studies of the polygraph, and to ignore as well the widespread reliance on the
polygraph outside the courtroom. Intelligence agencies, police departments, and big busi-
ness don't need to worry about prejudicingjuries, but they do need to worry about reliabil-
ity. Either the Black court is wrong about polygraph reliability, or a great many hard-
headed people in government and business are wasting time and money on
pseudoscience.
61 See, e.g., Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1986):
We have found no United States Court of Appeals decision which has affirmed the
admission of unstipulated polygraph evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, or
concluded that the refusal to admit polygraph evidence at trial was an abuse of discre-
tion. At least five other Courts of Appeais have held that unstipulated polygraph evi-
dence is per se inadmissible. Given the questionable reliability of polygraph evidence
and the great potential for prejudice from inaccurate polygraph evidence, we con-
clude that unstipulated polygraph evidence is inadmissible as technical or scientific
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because it does not 'assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.'
(citations & footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 169 (8th
Cir. 1975) ("The extent to which the polygraph evidence may tend to pervade the factfind-
ing process in ajury trial and the probable effect that such evidence may have upon jurors




able, it is less reliable than it may appear to ajury. They may discount
other evidence; and this is especially troubling given that when the
polygraph examination is incorrect, it will be because the witness is
found deceptive when in fact the truth was told.
The volume-of-litigation factor is one that courts have not much
addressed, but it is an obvious obstacle to a general rule of admissibil-
ity. Examination reliability heavily depends" on the quality of the ex-
aminer.62 A general rule of admissibility would mean that polygraph
services would be in universal demand. A litigant with a losing case
has good reason to try anything, and anyone whose adversary hires a
polygraph expert must do the same. The burgeoning demand would
lead to rationing a potentially decisive litigation advantage according
to means, or to a new army of fly-by-night "experts," and quite possibly
to both of these unhappy results.
These considerations, however, come into play at the second and
third stage of the Daubert inquiry. Suppose there is a relatively small
class of cases in which polygraph evidence is really needed. In such a
class of cases, in terms of Daubert's second stage, there would be a very
strong "fit" between the evidence and the case. Suppose further that
in this class of cases, the issue would be determined by the court, and
that situational prejudice typically means that the trier of fact is now
prevented from judging the facts on an impartial basis.
Isn't a suppression motion governed by conflicting testimony pre-
cisely such a case? Judges, not juries, rule on suppression motions.
Even judges are now unable to give due weight to the likely extent of
police perjury, because the swearing contest pits a police officer
against a criminal. Uniforms and badges can usurp the province of
the fact-finder just as powerfully as any scientific technique.63 Surely
judges can be trusted to give polygraph evidence no undue weight;
the more cogent objection is that they will not give it the weight it
deserves.
In United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc), the Elev-
enth Circuit broke with the prevailingjudicial hostility to unstipulated polygraph evidence,
but the departure was limited. The Piccinonna court held that polygraph evidence could
be admitted to corroborate a witness's testimony, but not "unless or until the credibility of
that witness were first attacked." Id. at 1536.
62 See OTA REPORT, supra note 51, at 83 ("It has long been recognized that the exam-
iner's skill has an important effect on the validity of polygraph tests."); JOHN E. REID &
FRED E. INBAu, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 304 (2d ed. 1977) ("Basic to all that has been said
with regard to the utility and accuracy of the Polygraph technique is the matter of exam-
iner qualifications."); JAMES ALLAN MATTE, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF THE POLYGRAPH TECH-
NIQUE 206 (1980) ("The defense attorney must remember that the strength and credibility
of the polygraph results are based upon the qualifications and expertise of the polygraphist
who administered the examination.").
63 See Cloud, supra note 39, at 1321-24 (five reasons why judges credit police perjury).
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Moreover, although suppression motions presenting swearing
contests are common, the class of suppression motions is vastly smaller
than the class of all trials. In most cases, we should suppose, it is the
defendant who is lying, not the officer. When' counsel asks the de-
fendant whether he would take a polygraph test to support the mo-
tion, the typical defendant with a false story will decline. Given the
tendency of the polygraph exam to fail primarily by discrediting true
testimony, rather than by crediting false testimony, counsel will make
it clear to the client that this is the wiser course.
Moreover, I do not propose automatic admissibility in all suppres-
sion hearings. Only if the outcome turns on credibility should poly-
graph testimony be admitted. As I argue later, the police have ways to
create credible records of many of their activities. Polygraph admissi-
bility to break swearing contests would give them an incentive to take
these steps. Thus, the ultimate point of admissibility is not to decide
cases according to the polygraph, but to eliminate deciding them ac-
cording to naked credibility judgments.
Thus suppression hearings provide an ideal opportunity for re-
ceiving polygraph evidence in a limited class of cases, in which the
evidence could make a dramatic contribution to improving the ad-
ministration ofjustice. One further point about the suppression con-
text deserves discussion. Not only is the suppression context ideal
from the standpoint of fit and prejudice; it is also a context in which
the risk of unreliable polygraph evidence is reduced to a minimum.
Unlike broad screening examinations given to employees, or
even interviews of a single suspect, in the swearing contest situation
the polygraph can dictate a false outcome only if two examinations
each produce an error of a different type. If both the defendant and
the police fail the exam, or if both pass the exam, the judge is back to
square one. But the police will know that failure to take the test will
justify a strong inference of deception. If the defendant passes, it will
be difficult for the government to prevail.
So typically the approach I defend will yield two polygraph exami-
nations. Either or both may be inconclusive, but ordinarily they will
produce a judgment of deception indicated or no deception indi-
cated. When the examinations interlock, suggesting that one party is
lying and the other is not, a decision based on the examinations is
quite unlikely to be a miscarriage of justice.
The polygraph exams could suggest a false result only if one
exam yielded a false negative, and the other exam yielded a false posi-
tive. Assume, conservatively, I believe, that the polygraph procedure
detects deception in 90% of cases, and detects nondeception in 80%
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of cases. Suppose further that the exams indicate deception by the
officer and none by the defendant. The probability that the defend-
ant is lying and the officer telling the truth, when the polygraph evi-
dence indicates the opposite, would then be 10% (the probability of a
false positive in the officer's exam) times 20% (the probability of a
false negative in the defendant's exam), for a 2% chance of error.
Given police credibility, would a judge rule in favor of the de-
fendant if the defendant passes his test and the officer refused to take
one? I should hope that in most cases the judge would do so, but
there is no way of knowing. The expert witness will make clear to the
judge that the most common type of error is a false indication of de-
ception. Thus, a "no deception indicated" result is quite probative of
honesty.
One of the problems ajudge faces in finding against the police is
the need to call the officer a liar. The polygraph offers an opportu-
nity for a slightly softer message: "I'm not saying you're lying, sir, but I
am saying that on the basis of the evidence in the record, your story is
uncorroborated and the defendant has passed a polygraph examina-
tion administered by a qualified expert."
Even if the pressure to admit evidence against a really nasty de-
fendant is so strong that a judge will disregard a successful defense
exam, good results would still follow from admitting the evidence. A
record would be made that the officer's story is suspect, a record that
could be important both to the police department and to the judge in
future cases. If it turns out thatjudges routinely discredit defense tes-
timony supported by favorable polygraph results, it would send a clear
signal that stronger medicine was required, such as requiring the police
to take examinations, or, in appropriate cases, reversing the judge's
factual findings as clearly erroneous.
Knowledge that a polygraph examination is possible might well
influence police behavior prior to the suppression hearing. Hope-
fully, those officers acting in bad faith will refrain from some unconsti-
tutional behavior they now indulge. The police may tell straighter
stories to prosecutors before the hearing if they know that the story
might be tested by a safeguard more material than the oath.
Could the defendant, or the police, a' la Aldrich Ames, beat the
polygraph? Countermeasures are possible,64 but if they were easy we
would expect the field studies to show less powerful results regarding
the validity of the "deception indicated" calls. Successful countermea-
sures depend on artificially boosting the response to the control ques-
64 See DAVID THORESON LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD 237-43 (1981); OTA REPORT,
supra note 51, at 87-89.
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tions, typically by muscular contraction or self-induced pain. In a
screening situation, when the examiner has no reason to suspect such
tactics, success is definitely possible. When these measures are not
unexpected, however, as when the subject is an experienced law en-
forcement officer or a drug dealer, the chances of success decline. 65
Moreover, there are counter-countermeasures available to examin-
ers.66 If the examiner determines that the subject is deliberately at-
tempting to defeat the examination, a conclusive inference of
dishonesty can be drawn.
Finally, we return to the fact that in the suppression context there
will be two examinations. If the officer's exam clearly suggests coun-
termeasures, or is inconclusive because the control-question responses
are peculiar, and the defendant passes his test, considerable light has
been shed on the fact at issue.
A strong case, then, supports admitting polygraph evidence to il-
luminate swearing contests in the context of suppression motions.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently has taken a modest but
important step toward accepting this case. In United States v. Posado,67
the court reversed a conviction obtained after the district court re-
fused to consider the defendants' polygraph evidence before denying
their motion to suppress.
Posado involved a swearing contest of the familiar type.68 The
three defendants arrived at the Houston airport, where they aroused
the suspicions of the police. The police retrieved their baggage and
squeezed the luggage, cadsing one of the bags to emit the odor of
fabric softener, which can be used to mask the scent of illegal drugs.
The police then confronted the suspects, who spoke no English so
that the ensuing conversations took place in Spanish, which was spo-
ken by one of the officers. Two of the suspects had no identification;
the one who did was identified by a name that did not match any of
the names on any of the bags.
According to the police testimony, the police then advised the
suspects that.they were free to leave, but the defendants voluntarily
agreed to accompany the police to the lower level of the airport where
the police could search the defendants' luggage. Once downstairs,
65 See LyvxEN, supra note 64, at 239-40 ("There is no doubt that it would be hard to beat
a lie test when the examiner expects you to try and knows how you mean to do it."). See also
Barry Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility in a
Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HASINGS LJ., 917, 962-65 (1975).
66 See Stan Albrams & Michael Davidson, Counter-Countermeasures in Polygraph Testing 17
POLYGRAPH 16 (1988) (recommending "activity sensor" for sophisticated subjects).
67 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995).
68 The account of the facts is drawn from Posado, 57 F.3d at 429-30.
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where the police were joined by a DEA agent who had taken custody
of the defendants' checked luggage, the police asked for the keys to
the padlocks securing the checked luggage. These the defendants did
not have. The police then informed the defendants of their right to
refuse to consent to the search, obtained consent both orally and in
writing, and then opened the luggage by prying the padlocks open,
discovering drugs.
According to the defendants' testimony, they believed themselves
compelled to accompany the police even though it risked missing the
flight. They further testified that the police did not inform them that
they had a right to refuse consent; that the police began to pry open
the locks without consent, but that during this process one of the of-
ficers ran back upstairs for a consent form. Only after the DEA agent
opened the luggage with a penknife did the officer return with the
form, which was executed by the defendants after the search. Defense
counsel arranged for polygraph examinations of the defendants prior
to the suppression hearing, and gave the prosecution an opportunity
to participate in the tests. Two different polygraph examiners found
no deception in the defendants' responses. The trial judge refused to
consider the polygraph evidence:
I am a great believer in polygraph, that polygraph technique, I
think it's extremely effective as a law enforcement tool. I do not believe,
however, that it belongs in the courtroom, either before the Court or
before the jury, for several reasons, one of which is that it will lead to an
impossible situation where we will have to hear polygraph experts on
both sides, and we'll get into the same battle of experts that we get into
in so many areas of law.
I am very concerned that it does have some valid use in determining
whether people are likely to be truthfiul or likely not to be truthful, how-
ever, I think it opens up some policy questions that belong either to
Congress or the appellate courts to resolve before we get into it here in
the courtroom. 69
The district court then denied the suppression motion, finding that
the defendants had consented to the search.
The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court concluded that the "district
court applied a per se rule against admitting polygraph evidence.
Even the government concedes that that rule is no longer viable after
Daubert. Therefore, the case must be remanded."70
The Court of Appeals did not hold that the polygraph evidence
must be admitted. Rather, the district courts are to follow each step of
the Daubert process-validity, fit, and the probity/prejudice balance-
69 Posado, 57 F.3d at 431 (quoting Judge Black's ruling in the District Court).
70 Id. at 432.
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on a case-by-case basis. The Posado court did suggest, however, that in
the instant case the defendants had a strong case at the third step of
the inquiry.
The court emphasized three factors. First, the prosecution knew
about the examinations. "In such a case, both parties have a risk in
the outcome of the polygraph examination, simultaneously reducing
the possibility of unfair prejudice and increasing reliability."71 "Sec-
ond, the evidence was not offered at trial before a jury, but in a pre-
trial hearing before the district courtjudge. A district court judge is
much less likely-than a lay jury to be intimidated by claims of scientific
validity into assigning an inappropriate evidentiary value to polygraph
evidence."72 Finally, the court pointed out that the particular facts in
the record "substantially boost the probative value of this evidence."73
The ensuing discussion is highly relevant for our purposes:
The evidence at the suppression hearing essentially required the district
court to decide between the story told by the officers and that told by the
defendants, not an unusual situation, and perhaps not sufficient alone to
justify admission of "tie-breaker" evidence carrying a high potential for prudi-
cial effect. In this case, however, there was more. Because Officer Rodri-
guez was the only Spanish-speaking officer on the scene, he alone could
testify as to what the defendants were told and as to their understanding
of whether they were under arrest or whether they were consenting to a
search of the baggage. Although Officer Rodriguez testified that he ex-
plained the consent form to the defendants, he was unable to read the
consent form (printed in Spanish) to the court at both the probable
cause hearing and the suppression hearing. There was also evidence
calling the officers' recollection of events into question. For example,
Officer Rodriguez testified incorrectly at the probable cause hearing
that the defendants were travelling with one-way tickets, a fact which he
said contributed to his reasonable suspicion that the defendants were
carrying drugs. The defendants were in fact holding round-trip tickets.
In addition, the defendants offered the testimony of a disinterested wit-
ness, an airline employee, who contradicted the officers' version of the
events surrounding their retrieval of the defendants' bags from the air-
line prior to the search. Finally, the defendants introduced at the sup-
pression hearing an order from a similar case in another district court in
the Southern District involving Officer Rodriguez. In that case, the dis-
trict court judge found that Officer Rodriguez' version of the events
leading up to the search in that case was "untruthful" and therefore sup-
pressed evidence obtained after the defendants allegedly consented to
the search. Taken individually, each one of these inconsistencies can be
explained and may seem inconsequential. Taken together, however, we
believe that they can be said to enhance the need for evidence, and
therefore its probative value, for clarifying which of the competing ver-





sions of what happened that day is true. 74
I applaud the Court's holding, and have only the highest respect for
the court's reluctance to decide the case on any broader ground than
necessary. With respect, however, I submit that the "plus factors" the
Court invoked to emphasize the probative value of the polygraph evi-
dence prove the necessity of a general rule of admissibility for poly-
graph evidence when a suppression motion turns on credibility.
How did the district judge conclude that the police were telling
the truth even in the absence of the polygraph evidence? Sure, the defend-
ants "voluntarily consented" to the police searching padlocked suitcases
containing in excess offive kilograms of cocaine. Sure, the police are tell-
ing a straight story, even though only one of them, whose testimony
was found untruthful in another case, who was demonstrably wrong
under oath about other facts in the case, and who couldn't read the
consent form himself, knew what the defendants said. And how can
you trust an airline employee, anyway?
If police testimony is believed under these circumstances, isn't it
obvious that police credibility and hostility to the exclusionary rule
already have usurped the role of the court in finding the facts-that
police testimony receives judicial deference that would make most ad-
ministrative agencies drool with envy? Isn't it just as obvious that the
case that most strongly calls for polygraph evidence is not the case in
which the defendants can point to objectively demonstrable holes in
the police testimony, but the case in which they cannot-the case in
which the swearing contest is pristine, unmixed with any issue besides
credibility? Isn't the temptation of police perjury heightened, rather
than diminished, when the defense can call no independent witness
and can point to no track record of untruthful testimony by the
police?
Again, the Posado court quite properly decided the case on the
narrowest possible ground. But the court's recognition of the proba-
tive value of the evidence applies, afortiori, to the more common sup-
pression hearing swearing contest in which police credibility is not
diluted by the testimony of independent witnesses or serious holes in
the police account. Daubert surely permits receiving polygraph evi-
dence in such a case. The increasingly obvious role of police perjury
in suppression hearings virtually compels it.
V. THE POSITIVE DYNAMICS OF ADMITTING POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE AT
SUPPRESSION HEARINGS
I know that many readers will entertain some justifiable skepti-
74 Posado, 57 F.3d at 435-36 (emphasis added).
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cism about a techno-fix for a problem as intractable as police perjury.
Surely it can't be that simple! I think there is a very good chance that
the solution might be just that simple. But I invite the skeptical to
consider my final, and most powerful argument: a rule of admissibil-
ity would create incentives for the police to actively prevent, rather
than actively encourage, swearing contests. Police routinely record
confessions, either stenographically, or on audio or videotape. They
do not record interrogations. Why not? A complete taped record
would eliminate uncertainty about Miranda waivers and about the
facts that govern coercion claims.
That's why not.
Now imagine police interrogation when the police know that the
suspect can take a polygraph exam that will be admissible in evidence.
The court just might believe him-and it might believe even though
the suspect is lying, rather than the police. After all, polygraphy isn't
perfect. It is quite possible for the officer to fail the exam even
though he is telling the truth. It is possible although highly unlikely
for the suspect to pass a test even though the suspect is lying. Coun-
termeasures are possible too, and so on down the list of skeptical res-
ervations about. the reliability of the polygraph procedure.
The police might start taping interrogations. Then it wouldn't
matter what the polygraph exam showed; indeed, under the approach
I advocate, polygraph evidence would be admissible only when the
issue cannot be resolved with objective evidence. Rather than take the
risk of a swearing contest they cannot count on dominating, the police
would finally have a strong incentive to record the facts in a reliable
way.
Unlike interrogation, which takes place in a carefully controlled
environment, searches and arrests sometimes require instantaneous
and violent action. Nonetheless, much search and seizure activity
could be reliably recorded. Some departments already have equipped
police cruisers with video cameras.7 5 Experiments are underway with
75 See, e.g., Holly Wagner, Newport Beach Council to Consider Request to Put Virdeo Cameras in
29 Police Cars, LA. TIMES, May 8, 1995, at B2; Jim McMahon, Police Receive Pa. Grant for
Vileo, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Aug. 3, 1995, at WI ("'It will be up to each individual
officer to determine when to use the equipment,' said [a police spokesman], who noted it
could be quite beneficial in the courtroom and in deterring false charges filed against the
arresting officer."). Outfitting a police car with a videotape recorder will cost almost $6,000
and should be completed within 60 days. A camera lens is typically mounted on the wind-
shield with the recorder unit stored in the trunk. Id.
Activating the system can occur when the roof lights are turned on or by other manual
operations. Some police departments that already use the equipment choose to run it at
all times. Lan Nguyen, Cameras Roll With Patrol Cars; 'Video Rides Shotgun on Arlington Streets,
WASH. PoST, July 6, 1995, at VI ("The department's newer hand-size video cameras attach
to the windshield and are connected to a black-and-white monitor. Officers can replay or
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miniature cameras officers can wear on their person.76 Undercover
police have worn concealed audio recorders for years. Citizen observ-
ers could be recruited to accompany police on patrol.
Expense would be no obstacle. The police frequently have the
equipment even now, and although car mounted or miniaturized per-
sonal video-cameras are expensive, basic audio and portable video
equipment is far cheaper. An 8 millimeter camcorder is no more ex-
pensive than a 9 millimeter automatic.
The police could turn the body-worn audio recorder on as soon
as they approach a suspect. They could videotape a pre-search warn-
ing of the right to refuse consent to search and the voluntary consent
of the suspect. They could do this now; but they have little reason to,
for they control the swearing contest. Break the police hold on the
swearing contest, and the swearing contest would become the excep-
tion rather than the rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
A growing body of evidence indicates what any shrewd observer
of human behavior could predict: the blank check of the swearing
contest tempts many police to accept the system's invitation to per-
jury. Permitting both sides to submit to admissible polygraph exami-
nations when the issue at a suppression hearing turns on credibility
offers an escape from the swearing contest trap. The polygraph is reli-
able enough for the police, the FBI, and the CIA. Trial court judges
have the experience and toughness of mind to consider polygraph
evidence for what it is worth. Polygraph evidence is worth a good
deal, but the greatest benefit from receiving it would be to create in-
centives for the police to provide reliable records of their activities.
A truism among lawyers holds that in ordinary litigation the facts
are more important than the law. George Orwell expressed this in-
sight harshly but clearly in 1984: He who controls the past controls
the future. The swearing contest effectively delegates the court's fact-
finding power to the police, giving them control of the past, and thus
of the future. Admitting polygraph evidence at suppression hearings
could enable the courts to reclaim that authority.
advance tape but cannot erase recordings.").
76 SeeJeff Collins, New Technology Can Turn Officers into Walking Lenses, Recording Contacts
for Their and the Public's Safety, ORANGE CouNTY REGISTER, May 8, 1995, at B1.
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